D3EUCITC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 -----x 3 CITY OF PONTIAC GENERAL EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 4 Plaintiff, 5 v. 11 CV 5026 (JSR) 6 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP., et al. 7 Defendants. 8 9 New York, N.Y. March 14, 2013 10 4:30 p.m. 11 Before: 12 HON. JED S. RAKOFF 13 District Judge 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff 16 BY: SAMUEL RUDMAN EVAN KAUFMAN 17 DLA PIPER 18 Attorneys for Defendants Lockheed Martin, et al. 19 BY: JAMES WAREHAM JAMES E. ANKLAM 20 JOHN HILLEBRECHT 21 22 23 24 25

1 (Case called) THE DEPUTY CLERK: City of Pontiac General Employees' 2 3 Retirement System v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 4 MR. RUDMAN: Good afternoon, your Honor. 5 Samuel Rudman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd for the 6 City of Pontiac. 7 THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. KAUFMAN: Good afternoon, your Honor. 8 9 Evan Kaufman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd on behalf 10 of the City of Pontiac. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 11 12 MR. WAREHAM: Good afternoon, your Honor. 13 Jamie Wareham from DLA on behalf of Robert Stevens, 14 Linda Gooden, Bruce Tanner and Lockheed Martin Corporation. 15 MR. ANKLAM: Good afternoon, your Honor. James Anklam from DLA on behalf of the same group of 16 17 defendants. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 18 MR. HILLEBRECHT: John Hillebrecht on behalf of the 19 20 same group of defendants. 21 Good afternoon. 2.2 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 23 So this is a sad day because the parties have settled

this dispute, depriving me of the pleasure of seeing you try a

case in my court, but I suppose it is in the interests of

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justice.

To get serious, I have reviewed your submissions, and I agree preliminarily and subject, of course, to being revisited at the time of the final hearing and applying the nine so-called Grinnell factors to this settlement, it does appear to be fair, reasonable and adequate.

I have a few picky problems with the proposed notice and preliminary order and things of that sort and one maybe slightly more substantive problem.

Let's start with the proposed order. The schedule you set forth there is too long. It is a schedule that has been used by other judges in other cases but I have taken to shortening the schedule considerably. For example, I think the settlement hearing should be about 60 days from now, not 100 days.

I think the other dates have to be adjusted accordingly, for example, I think the response to the notice could be 30 days rather than 55 days.

There are other days that you need to work out.

MR. WAREHAM: The CAFA, I think, requires a 90-day period. We have gone ahead and made CAFA notification to the Attorney General and that is the timing in these particular documents. Some of these cases, there is no CAFA notice. This one, we wanted to take the precaution.

THE COURT: I did not focus on whether -- does someone

have a copy of the relevant section of the CAFA that you are referring to?

MR. ANKLAM: It is 28, U.S.C., Section 1715. It says that it should be 90 days after the notice has been sent to the Attorney General of the United States and the relevant state authorities.

THE COURT: Well, those Attorney Generals can't get their act together. So we need to abide by it, so it has to be 90 days.

MR. WAREHAM: Your Honor, we have sent the notice, so it is timed at 90 days from that date. We have already started that clock ticking.

THE COURT: I am going to leave it to you to figure out the dates, but basically I want the shortest possible permitted by law, so work that out.

With respect to the notice that goes to the class members, the basic problem I have with your notice is that, for someone who is not a lawyer, it is really difficult to follow. There are lots and lots of definitions. It takes a while before one gets to exactly what the options are.

You can contact my law clerk to get examples of simpler notices that I have used in the last few months in other cases, rather than my going through it item by item, but that will give you an idea, but the general idea is to simplify it.

One particularly problematic language that I wanted to call to your attention is presently on page 19, although on your revision, I hope it is much earlier, where you say in boldface: "If you are a class member you need do nothing (other than timely file a proof of claim and release form) if you wish to participate in distribution of the net settlement fund. Your interests will be represented by lead counsel."

But then you go on to say in solid caps: "To participate in the distribution of the net settlement fund, you must kindly complete and return the proof of claim and release form that accompanies this notice."

I fear that someone who is unsophisticated would think that they don't have to do anything to participate. And, moreover, frankly, I don't see how anyone would choose not to participate if they are not choosing to opt out. Why would they want to be a member of the class but not participate in the distribution? That would be weird. So that's a good example of language that needs to be fixed.

Now, with respect to attorney's fees, you are free, of course, to request up to 33 percent -- of course, you are free to request whatever you want, but I must say that seems, to me, high.

And I just want to put you on notice that you will have a lot of convincing to do before I approve 33 percent.

Every case is different. This was a hard fought case. I am

certainly not suggesting that this is a case for 5 or 10 percent and, of course, I will need to look at various factors before I make a determination on legal fees.

So this doesn't affect what you are -- send it out with 33 percent if you want to, but I don't want anyone to be under the illusion that -- let me put it this way. At present, there is no better than a 33 percent probability that I will award you 33 percent fees. Anyway, there you are.

Going back to the notice for one minute, on page 1 -I meant to mention it before -- you say, down towards the
bottom: "It is estimated that if class members submit claims
for 100 percent of shares eligible for distribution, the
estimated average distribution per share would be approximately
56 cents before deduction for court-approved fees and expenses.
Historically actual claim rates are listed at 100 percent which
result in higher distribution or shared actual recovery from
this fund," etc., etc.

I think there should be in there an indication that, if you are asking for 33 percent legal fees and up to million dollars in expenses, that this would reduce the recovery to whatever that is, roughly, two-thirds of 56 cents. If I give less than 33 percent, everyone will be delighted, the persons getting this notice, but what I am concerned with is, again, an unsophisticated reader thinks, I am getting 56 cents or something close to it and then they get a lot less because of

all of the deductions.

Somewhere in there, I think there was some Latin like in custodia legis or something like that. I don't want to demean your learnedness, but "legal custody" might be just as good.

The last question I had, how could expenses be up to a million dollars?

MR. RUDMAN: Obviously, Judge, on final approval, we will provide detailed expenses, but there was a tremendous amount of travel in the case and, also, a tremendous amount of experts.

THE COURT: Again, I don't have to rule on any given item right now, but that seemed to me kind of high.

How many experts did you have?

MR. RUDMAN: We had three or four, Judge -- accounting, loss causation, damages and materiality.

I don't recall how many experts the defendants had, but we also --

THE COURT: That is not your --

MR. RUDMAN: I am trying to figure out if it is different or not.

THE COURT: In terms of travel, I am reminded, in the Dewey law firm bankruptcy, Judge Glenn issued an opinion -- you might have seen it -- saying that he was not going to approve any money for taxis because there is nothing wrong with the

subway.

That, of course, might not apply to people coming from out of town. I guess the functional equivalent, which I won't stand on ceremony is, they could always take Greyhound rather than fly. But, for example -- and I am sure this won't be the case -- I had a class settlement about four years ago in which lead counsel who was from out of town stayed at the Four Seasons New York at \$1400 a night, and I know he was very disappointed when I only approved \$300 of that per night.

MR. RUDMAN: Your Honor, I can assure you that before we make a final application, the expenses will be thoroughly vetted to make sure that there is none of that in the expenses. I can also assure you that, inasmuch as it was a contingency case and these were all hard dollars that we were laying out, we were very careful to try to keep the expenses as low as we could.

THE COURT: Now, the final thing, and I can't remember whether this is reflected in language anywhere, but it might be -- I just wanted to put you on notice -- I will never approve a settlement in which 100 percent or anything close to 100 percent of the legal fees are paid prior to distribution to the class. You are probably familiar with that.

MR. RUDMAN: I am aware of that.

THE COURT: 50 percent.

Anything any of the parties want to raise?

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MR. RUDMAN: Nothing.

MR. WAREHAM: Nothing, your Honor.

THE COURT: So get me a revised copy as soon as you are able to. And as soon as you get it to me, I will fill in the last couple of dates and get it signed and sent off.

MR. RUDMAN: Thank you, very much, your Honor.

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